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Arthur H. Westing*

The Environmental Aftermath of
Warfare in Viet Nam t
INTRODUCTION
The Second Indochina War of 1961-75 is noted for the widespread
and severe environmental damage that was inflicted upon its theatre of
operations, especially in the former South Viet Nam. I This article reviews
the character and extent of the initial ecological disruption brought about
by military actions (primarily those during the late 1960s and very early
1970s) and describes the nature and pace of recovery and some of the
related reconstruction efforts made during the first five or so postwar
years. The emphasis is upon Viet Nam and especially upon the former
South Viet Nam, the region which was most severely disrupted from an
environmental standpoint.
As far as is possible, the present analysis dwells upon the natural
environment and renewable natural resources. One must recognize, however, that the region in question has long been a heavily populated one,
supporting an agrarian society that depends for its survival upon exploiting
the natural resources of the region on a continuing basis. The natural and
human environments are thus inextricably intertwined there, and matters
of postwar recovery and reconstruction must often be treated in tandem.
After briefly describing the land and population of Viet Nam and the
strategy and consequences of the Second Indochina War (including a
minor digression on dioxin), this article reviews the postwar status of
Viet Nam's major renewable natural resources: inland forests, coastal
mangroves, fisheries, wildlife, and food and industrial crops. In conclusion, we examine the lesson to be learned from the Viet Nam debacle.
The Land and Population of Viet Nam
Viet Nam is a mountainous country dominated by two powerful rivers,
the Red River in the north, and the Mekong River in the south. Two
deltas and the narrow coastal plain that connects them are devoted in
*Senior Research Fellow, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and Adjunct Professor
of Ecology, Hampshire College, Amherst, MA.
fReprinted with permission from the 1982 SIPRI YEARBOOK, ch. 11, published by the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Solna, Sweden (1982).
1. See Westing, Ecological Consequences of the Second Indochina War, 1976 SIPRI Y.B. (1976).
See also, Westing, Warfare in a Fragile World: MilitaryImpact on the Human Environment, 1980
SIPRI Y.B. (1980).
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large part to rice cultivation. Overall, some 25 percent of Viet Nam's
land surface is in agricultural use; about 67 percent is considered forest
land; and perhaps 1 percent is covered by inland waters. Table 1 summarizes land disposition in the country.
The population of Viet Nam in 1981 was approximately 55.0 million,
and growing rapidly (see Table 2). There are three large cities-Ho Chi
Minh City with 3.4 million inhabitants, Hanoi with 2.6 million, and the
nearby port of Haiphong with 1.3 million-and various smaller ones.
Nonetheless, an estimated 81 percent of Viet Nam's population is rural,
and most of these people are farmers. Approximately 88 percent of the
total population is ethnically Vietnamese, living mostly on the deltas or
coastal plain, whereas the remaining 12 percent belong to some sixty
TABLE 1
Land Disposition in Viet Nam, 1979a

Category

Area
(million ha)

Percentage of
Total Land Area

Agriculture
Rice (paddy and upland)
Other cereals (maize, etc.)
Other foods
Annual industrial crops
Rubber
Other perennial industrial crops

8.4
5.5
1.4
1.0
0.3
0.1
0.1

25

Savanna and pasture

2.0

6

22.0
21.4
0.6

67

Forestb
Inland
Coastal

17
4
3
1
0
0

65
2

Miscellaneous land

0.3

1

Inland waters,

0.4

1

Total d

33.1

100

'VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, STATISTICAL DATA OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM 51-79

(1979); SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM: BASIC DATA 51, 68 (Foreign Languages Publishing House 1978);
UMBRICHT, LANKESTER, & PANTULU, supra note 11, at 132; FAO, FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 52 (1979); and
V. LAP, VIETNAM: GEOGRAPHICAL DATA (1979).
bThe forest category includes 2.1 million ha of lands not at present covered by trees (14 percent of the forest
category and 9 percent of all Viet Nam). It also includes 11. 1 million ha of commercial forest.
'Inland waters include 0.1 million ha devoted to pisciculture. VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, supra
item a, at 51.
dNorth Viet Nam, 15.8 million ha; South Viet Nam, 17.3 million ha. Id. at table 1.
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different and more or less primitive, ethnically distinct tribes largely living

a semi-nomadic existence in the mountains.2
Viet Nam was under French colonial domination and exploitation from
the mid-19th century to 1954; was under harsh and even more intensely
exploitative Japanese occupation from 1940 to 1945; fought a vicious
and draining war of ihdependence from 1946 to 1954; soon again a

devastating war from 1961 to 1975; and has had a number of disrupting
military involvements since then. The result of a century or so of exploitation, capped by its recent environmental holocaust, is that Viet Nam
TABLE 2
The Population of Viet Nam

Year

Total'
(million)

Ruralb
(million)

Percentage
Rural of Total

Ho Chi Minh City
(Saigon)'
(million)

1960
25.5
85
1.4
30 .0d
1975
47.61
37.4
79
4.2
1976
49.2
39.0
79
3.6
1977
50.4
40.3
80
3.5
1978
51.4
41.3
80
3.5
f
1979
42.49
81
3.4
52 .5
1980
53.7
1981
55.0
1982
56.3
a1960 data from G. HUNG, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST VIETNAM 1955-80, at 4-5 (1977); 1975-79
data from ViEr NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, STATISTICAL DATA OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET
NAM 15 (1979); the values for 1980-82 are extrapolations from the 1979 datum, using a continuous compound
growth rate of 2.4 percent (based on the populations for 1975-79) which leads to a doubling time of 29 years
(see also item f infra). An estimated one million persons emigrated from Viet Nam during 1975-80. Fraser,
Vietnam's FirstCensus, 8 INTERCOM 8 at 8 (1980).
b1960 datum based on 85 percent of total estimate, N. VIEN, VIETNAM: FIVE YEARS AFTER 7 (1980); 1975-79
data from Vmr NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, supra item a, at table 3.
c1960 datum interpolated from 2 EUROPA Y.B. 1962 at 1369 and 2 EUROPA Y.B. 1963 at 1194; 1975 datum from
UMBRICHT, LANKESTER, & PANTULU, supra note 11, at 90; 1976-79 data from VmT NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL
OFFICE, supra item a, at 7 (1976); 12 (1977); table 1 (1978); and 11(1979).
dNorth Viet Nam, 15.9 million; South Viet Nam, 14.1 million. G. HUNO, supra item a.

'North Viet Nam, 24.3 million; South Viet Nam, 23.3 million. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM 12 (Foreign
Languages Publishing House 1975). The growth in population for all Viet Nam during 1960-75 can be calculated
to have continuously compounded at the rate of 3.1 percent (doubling time of 22 years).
rNorth Viet Nam, 26.3 million; South Viet Nam, 26.2 million. VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL

OFFICE,

supra

item a, at table I. The 1975-79 growth rate for North Viet Nam can be calculated to have been 2.0 percent
(doubling time 35 years); for South Viet Nam, it was 2.9 percent (doubling time 24 years); for all of Viet Nam,
see item a, supra. An estimated 41 percent of the population of Viet Nam is under the age of 15 years. Fraser,
Notes on Population and Family Planning in Vietnam, 25 J. FAMILY WELFARE No. 3, at 71 (1979). Over one
percent of the population is in the armed forces. See supra note 4, U.S. ARMS CONTROLt
AND
AGENCY, at table 2.

DISARMAMENT

9Of the rural population, 37.6 million, or 88 percent, were engaged in agriculture in 1979 (i.e., 71 percent of the
total population). Fraser, supra item a, at 9. More than 300,000 of the rural population are engaged in fishing,
U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 5, at 6.

2. SOCIALIST
1978).

REPUBLIC OF VtET NAM: BASIC DATA 39 (Foreign Languages Publishing House
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today stands among the poorest and least economically developed nations
in the world. Its renewable natural resource base has been devastated,
its infrastructure severely disrupted, and its overall economy shattered.
In South Viet Nam there was additionally a dearth of able leaders and
other administrators at the end of the Second Indochina War, owing to
their systematic assassination by the United States as a part of its socalled Phoenix Program. 3 Its largely agrarian society must cope with an
agricultural and associated water conservancy system that was widely
damaged by a combination of military actions and forced abandonment
and neglect. As a result, Viet Nam is now only about 85 percent selfsufficient in staple foods, and its gross national product per capita is
below $300 (1980 value). 4 In the words of a recent United Nations report,
"... almost everywhere there is a lack of equipment, spare parts, and
repair and maintenance facilities. As a result, it is almost impossible to
provide basic everyday services reliably and properly; similarly, the productive capacity of industry is very low and continually deteriorating." 5
THE SECOND INDOCHINA WAR
The Second Indochina War of 1961-75 consisted of more or less distinct
conflicts complicated by massive U.S. involvement. The ecological and
related consequences of the war have been described elsewhere, 6 and a
number of very useful bibliographies are available. 7
Strategy and Consequences
The Second Indochina War can be summarized as an unsuccessful
attempt by the United States to prevent the government of the Republic
of [South] Viet Nam from being replaced by the National Front for
Liberation of South Viet Nam cum Revolutionary Government of South
3. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 92d CONG., 1st SESS., U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN VIET NAM 175-242 (1971).

4. See U.S.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND

ARMS TRANSFERS 1969-78, ACDA PUBLICATION No. 108, Table 1 (1980). See also R. I. SIVARD,
WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES at Table 4 (1980).
5. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, COUNTRY PROGRAMME FOR VIET NAM: UNDP

1982-1986, UNDP DOC.
No. DP/GC/VIE/R.2 at 21 (1981).
6. Westing (1976), supra note 1, at ch. 3; see also, Westing, Environmental Consequences of
the Second Indochina War: a Case Study, 4 AMBIO 216 (1975); Pfieffer, Post-War Vietnam, 15
ENVIRONMENT 9 at 29 (1973); U.S. CHEMICAL WARFARE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: DOSSIER (Vietnam
Courier 1980); and VIET NAM: DESTRUCTION, WAR DAMAGE 23 (Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1977).
ASSISTANCE REQUESTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF VIET NAM FOR THE PERIOD

7. See R. BURNS & M. LEITENBERG, WAR IN VIETNAM (2d ed. 1983). See also, Westing, Herbicides

as Weapons: a Bibliography, 3 POL. ISSUES SERIES 1 (1974); and Westing & Lumsden, Threat of
Modern Warfare to Man and His Environment: An Annotated Bibliography,UNESCO REPORTS &
PAPERS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 40 (1979).
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TABLE 3
Hostile Actions by the United States Against Viet Nam During the
Second Indochina Wara
Munitions Fired
Region
North Viet Nam
b
South Viet Nam
Military Region
Military Region
Military Region
Military Region
All Viet Nam

1
II
I1
IV

Herbicides Sprayed

Land Cleared

(1/ha)

(thousand
ha)

(m2/
ha)

0
72.4
12.3
15.2
38.4
6.5

0
4.2
4.4
2.0
12.7
1.7

0
325
70
50
200
5

0
190
250
60
660
10

72.4

2.1

325

100

(thousand

(million
tons)

(kg/ha)

m )

1.1
10.2
3.3
2.1
4.3
0.5

70
590
1,170
270
1,430
130

11.3

330

3

'The data are derived from SIPRI Y.B. (1976), supra note 1; munitions at Table 2.2; herbicides at Table 3.5; land

cleared (by Rome plough tractors) at 46-50; and the regional areas from Table 1.1.
'The former military regions of South Viet Nam are depicted in SIPRI Y.B. id., at chapter 4.

Viet Nam or, eventually, from being annexed by the Democratic Republic
of [North] Viet Nam, with ancillary U.S. military involvement against
Laos and Kampuchea. 8 The U.S. strategy against North Viet Nam involved heavy bombing and naval shelling in order to destroy systematically industry, transportation networks, and all manner of public buildings.
The U.S. strategy against South Viet Nam involved truly massive rural
area bombing, chemical and mechanical forest destruction, large-scale
crop destruction, destruction of food stores, the destruction of hospitals,
and large-scale population displacements-in short, the massive, intentional disruption of both the natural and human ecologies of the region
(see Table 3).
.The loss of life in Viet Nam during the war was enormous: an estimated
1.5 million Vietnamese were killed, representing 4 percent of the population (3 percent in North Viet Nam and 5 percent in South Viet Nam). 9
Moreover, non-fatal casualties must have exceeded three times that number. Wartime population displacements in Viet Nam involved some 10
million people at one time or another, primarily in South Viet Nam (i.e.,
over half of its population). '0
Of the major cities in North Viet Nam, Haiphong and essentially only
the outskirts of Hanoi were bombed. All five of North Viet Nam's in8. Westing (1976), supra note 1, at 18.
9. Id. at 36.
10. Casella, Dateline Vietnam: Managing the Peace, 30 FOREIGN POLICY 170 (1978).
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dustrial centers were demolished. I All 29 provincial capitals were bombed,
and 12 of them razed; 96 of its 116 district capitals were bombed, and
51 of them razed; and about 2,700 of its 4,000 or so rural villages were
bombed, and 300 of them razed. Virtually every railway and highway
bridge was destroyed, as were many hundreds of public buildings. In the
process, many hundreds of water conservancy works and irrigation dikes
and much farmland and livestock were damaged or destroyed. Countless
unexploded munitions remained at the end of the war, continuing to cause
scores of casualties annually, many of them fatal.
About 9,000 of approximately 15,000 rural villages in South Viet Nam
were damaged or destroyed, and millions of people were driven into
Saigon, Danang, Hue, and other urban areas.' 2 Saigon swelled from a
prewar population of 1.4 million to 4.2 million (Table 2). When the war
ended, South Viet Nam was burdened with more than 600,000 war orphans, several hundred thousand war widows, about 400,000 invalided
war cripples, some 3 million unemployed, about 600,000 prostitutes, and
an estimated 500,000 drug addicts. 13 As in North Viet Nam, there remains
a legacy in South Viet Nam of unexploded munitions that each year kill
and maim scores of those who must work the land. Millions of South
Vietnamese at the end of the war suffered from such serious ailments as
malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, bubonic
plague, poliomyelitis, venereal
14
diseases, and psychiatric disorders.
Throughout Viet Nam, some 360,000 disabled war victims of laboring
age (both military and civilian) currently receive governmental compensation, 140,000 of whom are totally disabled, and the remainder partially
disabled. 5 These numbers do not by any means represent all such war
casualties. Moreover, throughout Viet Nam today 1.1 million war orphans, who have lost both parents, exist and many of them have nutritionally based and other disabilities. The number of rehabilitation centers
in the country is far from adequate, and the available ones are understaffed
with trained personnel and inadequately equipped.
Finally, the Second Indochina War resulted in massive damage to field
and forest, especially in South Viet Nam, the subject of the following
sections. This war was remarkable in that a great power attempted to
subdue a peasant army through the profligate use of technologically ad11. N. K. VIEN, VIETNAM: FIVE YEARS AFTER 7 (1980). See also, VIET NAM: DESTRUCTION, WAR
supra note 6, at 28-31; and V. UMBRICHT, C. LANKESTER, & V. PANTULU, REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL MISSION ON INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF VIET NAM 16 (1978).
12. UMBRICHT, id. at 15-16. See also, VIEN, id. at 6-7, and VIET NAM: DESTRUCTION, WAR
DAMAGE, supra note 6, at 23-27.
13. M. BJELIC, REPORT ON THE MISSION CONCERNING REHABILITATION OF WAR VICTIMS AND OTHER
DISABLED PERSONS IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 5 (1978).
14. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, REPORT ON THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM (1976).
15. BJELIC, supra note 13, at 5.
DAMAGE,
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vanced weapons and techniques. A number of these weapons and techniques were inescapably anti-ecological, especially those employed against
the land and people of South Viet Nam. The result in South Viet Nam
was the widespread, long-lasting, and severe disruption of forest lands,
of perennial croplands, and of farmlands, that is to say, of millions of
hectares of the natural resource base essential to an agrarian society.
The Dioxin Question
During the Second Indochina War, a substantial quantity of dioxin
(2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodiben/o-para-dioxin, or TCDD) was inadvertently
disseminated into the South Vietnamese environment as an impurity of
so-called Agent Orange, the most widely and heavily used of the several
anti-plant chemical warfare agents employed by the United States. 16 Dioxin
is briefly singled out here owing primarily to its notoriety as a highly
potent human toxin and teratogen, and its apparent mutagenic and carcinogenic effects on humans.
It is not possible to establish the exact quantities, locations, and dates
of dioxin application. A conservative early estimate of the total quantity
of dioxin applied was 110 kg, 17 whereas a recent estimate based on
somewhat more complete information is 170 kg. ' 8 An estimated 90 percent of the dioxin was disseminated during 1966-69. It was applied to
about 1 million hectares of South Viet Nam, approximately 90 percent
as part of the anti-forest program. About two-thirds of the affected area
received approximately 110 mg/ha of dioxin, although multiple applications caused some areas to be subjected to two to five times this amount.
The several provinces surrounding Ho Chi Minh City, that is, the former
Military Region III (including War Zones C and D and the Iron Triangle)
received more than half the total amount.
The amount of dioxin that remains in the environment following application to an area diminishes with time, owing primarily to degradation
and dissipation. About half the amount of aerially applied dioxin decomposes within a few days, with the remainder becoming more permanently
incorporated into the ecosystem, that is, into the soil and biota. 19 Once
thus incorporated, dioxin's subsequent disappearance can be assumed to
follow an exponential decay curve (i.e., follow first-order kinetics) and
16. See Westing (1980), supra note 1, at ch. 3. See also, Westing, Ecological Considerations
Regarding Massive Environmental Contamination with 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin, 27
ECOLOGICAL BULL. 285 (1978).
17. Westing (1976), supra note 1, at 26.
18. A Young, unpublished lecture, U.S. Air Force (May 28, 1980).
19. Crosby, Photodecomposition of Chlorinated Dibenzo-p-dioxin, 173 SCIENCE 749 (1971); and
Crosby & Wong, Environmental Degradation of 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD,) 195
SCIENCE 1337-38 (1977).
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is thus expressible in half-lives. On the basis of some published field
data, this environmental half-life for dioxin has been calculated to be 2.9
years.20 More recent field data 2 ' permit a similar calculation to be made
that gives a value of 3.5 years. In the case of Viet Nam, if one makes
the simplifying assumption that the estimated 170 kg of dioxin had all
been introduced in 1968, then perhaps 8 kg remained at large in 1980,
3 kg will be present in 1985, and 1 kg in 1990.
Dioxin is apparently non-toxic to plants and thus can be assumed to
have had little if any effect on the natural or cultivated vegetation of Viet
Nam. Moreover, in the amounts involved, its effect on indigenous wildlife
populations appears at worst to have been transitory and, therefore, probably negligible. However, it is possible, if not likely, that occasional
heavy localized applications of dioxin resulted in some wildlife and livestock losses, especially perhaps of poultry.2 2
The question of whether the applied dioxin had a health impact on the
indigenous human population of Viet Nam is still under active investigation there. 23 The possibility of long-term health effects on U.S. troops
that had been exposed during the war is also a matter of continuing
concern. 24 The fact that dioxin is mobile in the environment and can
move up a food chain that culminates in humans, perhaps concentrating
somewhat in the process, 25 lends credence to the possibility of dioxinrelated human health problems in Viet Nam.
THE POST-WAR STATUS OF VIET NAM'S
RENEWABLE RESOURCES
To a major extent, Viet Nam must depend upon the renewable natural
resources that can be derived from its forests, fields, and waters (both
inland and nearby ocean) for its industrial raw materials and as items for
export in exchange for imported oil and other crucial basic commodities
which the country lacks. The following sections summarize several major
renewable resources.
Inland (Upland) Forests
Forest lands cover two-thirds of Viet Nam (Table 1) and trees must be
counted among the nation's most important natural resources.6 The for20. Westing, supra note 16, at 290.
21. Young, supra note 18.
22. Westing, Herbicidal Damage to Cambodia, HARVEST OF DEATH: CHEMICAL WARFARE IN
VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA 196-97 (J. NEILANDS, ed. 1972).
23. Hay, Vietnam's Dioxin Problem, 271 NATURE 597-98 (1978).
24. STAATS, U.S. GROUND TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WERE IN AREA SPRAYED WITH HERBICIDE
ORANGE, USGAO REP. FPCD-80-23 (1979).
25. Westing, supra note 16, at 289.
26. UMBRICHT, supra note 11, at 123-90; Westing, Forestry and the War in South Vietnam, 69
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TABLE 4
Forestry and Forest Products in Viet Nama
Sawnwood
Production'
(million

Sawnwood
Per Unit Areac

Sawnwood
Per Capita d

Paper
Production,
(thousand

Lumber
Export'
(million

Year

In )

(m /ha)

(m /cap)

tons)

m )

1960
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

2.59
1.3
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.8

0.23
0.11
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.16

0.083
0.026
0.034
0.033
0.034
0.033

42
75
71
69
54

0.00
0.02
0.05
0.06
0.07

3

3

3

3

'In addition to the
timber (roundwood) removals, fuel wood (firewood plus charcoal) is cut at the annual rate of
perhaps 0.36 m3/cap, i.e., for a nationwide total now of approximately 19 million m3/year, FAO, FAO YEARBOOK
OF FORESTPRODUCTs 223 (1978); or perhaps somewhat more. See UMBRICHT, LANKESTER & PANTULU, supra
note 11, at 147. However, apparently only of the order of 2 million m3/yr of this is derived from Viet Nam's
commercial forests. Forestry and the War in South Vietnam, supra note 26, at 780; and Postwar Forestry, supra
note 26, at 154.
11960 datum combined from Forestry and the War in South Vietnam, id., at 780, and Postwar Forestry, id., at
154. 1975-79 data from VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, STATISTICAL DATA OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC
OF VIETNAM, table 19 (1979) and table 13 (1978).
cBased on a commercial forest area of 11. 1 million ha.
dBased on population figures from Table 2.
'From VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, supra item b, at table 19 (1979) and table 13 (1978). A modest

fraction of Viet Nam's paper is not derived from bamboo or other tree fibre.
trom VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, supra item b, at 86 (1979) and table 38 (1978).
North Viet Nam, I million M3 ; South Viet Nam, 1.5 million M 3 .

ests, which are divided more or less evenly between North and South
Viet Nam, now provide the nation with almost 2 million cubic meters
per year of timber plus large amounts of fuel wood (Table 4). This section
deals with the inland (upland) forest, comprising 97 percent of the total,
whereas the next section deals with the coastal mangrove forest, which
accounts for the remaining 3 percent.

The inland forests of Viet Nam-11. 1 million ha of which are considered to be commercially exploitable 27-support some 200 commercial
species, a dozen or more of which are of exceedingly high quality and
suitable for the world market.
Because of a variety of factors, the forests of Viet Nam are considered
to be in generally poor condition. They were casually exploited for many
1. FORESTRY 777-83 (1971); Westing, Letter to the Editor, 70 J. FORESTRY 129 (1972); Westing,
Letter to the Editor, 73 J. FORESTRY 755 (1975); Westing, Postwar Forestry in North Vietnam, 72
I. FORESTRY 153 (1974); Uibrig & Pfaff, Zur Entwicklung von Waldinventur und Forstprojektierung
im Norden der Sozialistischen Republik Vietnam, 11 BEITRAGE FUR DIE FORSTWIRTSCHAFT 75 (1977);

md Thomasius II, Wdlder der Sozialistischen Republik Vietnam, 124 PETERMANNS
qnrrEILUNGEN I, at 23 (1980).
27. Thomasius II, id. at Table 1, and Westing (1976), supra note 1, at 5.
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decades during the French colonial period, and ruthlessly exploited by
the Japanese during World War II. They were badly damaged during the
Second Indochina War. Perhaps most importantly, they have been severely
degraded as a timber resource by centuries of shifting slash-and-burn
agriculture by Viet Nam's sixty or more primitive hill tribes. Recent
population increases among these national minority groups and a declining
area of land available to them have inevitably led to a slash-and-burn
rotation too brief for adequate rejuvenation of the exploited land. An
estimated 10,000 ha are cleared in this way in North Viet Nam each
year, 28 and presumably as much again in South Viet Nam.
The almost 6 million ha of commercial forest in South Viet Nam were
especially hard hit during the Second Indochina War by a combination
of chemical attack, bombing, and tractor clearing (so-called Rome ploughing).29 Over a period of about a decade, the United States expended about
10 million tons of high-explosive bombs, shells, and other explosives
against South Viet Nam (Table 3). The damage that can be attributed to
this assault on the rural reaches of South Viet Nam is best presented in
two stages, complete obliteration, and severe damage. The first category
consists of that land, to a very large extent forest, which was converted
to craters by the high-explosive munitions. Such crater-obliterated areas
add up to just over 100,000 ha, perhaps 1 percent of the entire South
Vietnamese forest. Among many small artillery craters, an estimated 10
to 15 million large bomb craters were created in South Viet Nam, and
these have for the most part become a semi-permanent feature of the
regional geomorphology. The second category consists of that land which
was subjected to flying metal fragments (shrapnel). The zone subjected
to such abuse at an intensity lethal to 50 percent or more of exposed
personnel amounts to almost 5 million ha, representing over 40 percent
of the total forest lands of South Viet Nam. This last defined area is one
in which many of the trees present were injured by shrapnel, an event
that, in the tropics particularly, leads to fungal entry and decay, inevitably
followed by a significant proportion of tree mortality.
The damage caused by chemical anti-plant agents to the forests of
South Viet Nam is also best presented under two headings: virtually
complete obliteration and partial damage . 3 0 The first category comprises
the upland forest land that was sprayed four or more times. This category
of virtual obliteration covers about 50,000 ha. The second category com28. Westing, PostwarForestry, supra note 26.
29. Westing (1976), supra note 1. See also, UMBRICHT, supra note 11, at 23-90; Bengtsson,
Ecological Effects of Chemical Warfare and Bombing in Vietnam, R-3 SWEDISH AGENCY FOR RESEARCH COOPERATION WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1976); and C. MEYENFELDT, RESTORATION OF
DEVASTATED INLAND FORESTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM (1978).
30. Westing (1976), supra note 1, at 24-45.
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prises upland forests that were sprayed one to three times. This area has
been calculated to cover some 1.3 million ha (12 percent of South Viet
Nam's total forest). The first of these categories is estimated to have
experienced between 85 and 100 percent tree mortality, whereas the
second experienced between 10 to 50 percent.
The environmental disruption attributable to the 200 or so huge Rome
plough land-clearing tractors is easy to summarize. 3 This bizarre category
of complete tree removal and topsoil disturbance amounted to some 325,000
ha, that is, approximately 3 percent of the total South Vietnamese forest
lands.
Combining the several separate estimates of damage presented above
by simple addition would inflate the extent of damage since some of the
areas were subjected to more than one category of insult. The summations
are therefore reduced by 10 percent to allow for such overlap. Thus,
complete or essentially complete devastation of South Viet Nam's upland
forests occurred to an estimated 417,000 ha, representing about 4 percent
of its total forest lands. The partially damaged forest lands are estimated
to have covered at least an additional 5.6 million ha, or just over half of
forest land area.
In terms of primary forest products, the military damage described
above has been estimated to have resulted in as much as 75 million m 3
of destroyed timber, assuming that each hectare of commercial forest had
an average prewar merchantable stocking of 90 M 3 . 32 This amounts to
about 14 percent of the standing merchantable timber crop of South Viet
Nam, or to about 8 percent for all of Viet Nam. Moreover, with the
assumption of a growth rate of 0.6 percent per year, it will take perhaps
thirteen years for Viet Nam's 11.1 million ha of commercial forest to
make up this loss without any concomitant harvesting, or, somewhat
more realistically, about 40 years with continuing harvest of 4 million
m3/yr (the approximate current value of timber plus fuel wood removals;
see Table 4). The effects of particulate erosion and nutrient dumping (loss
to the soil of nutrients in solution) will reduce the annual increment in
the badly damaged areas, thereby extending the overall recovery period
somewhat, as will increased removals. Conversely, artificial regeneration
(planting) will shorten it.
In the upland forests of South Viet Nam which had been heavily damaged during the war, the land is now again fully occupied with vegetation
except for some steep areas in which erosion and forest fires had exposed
bedrock. The replacement vegetation is in many of the heavily damaged
areas comprised almost entirely of herbaceous grasses and in others of
31. Id. at ch. 4, Table 1.1, and Map 1.2.
32. Westing (1980), supra note 1, at 83.
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shrubby bamboos. Standing dead tree trunks, killed during the war, are
still widely in evidence and regularly harvested, some for timber but
mostly for fuel. In some parts of the country, for example in Tay Ninh
province, large areas of destroyed forest have recently been or are in the
process of being converted to agriculture as part of the new frontier or
new economic zone program.
Viet Nam's prewar merchantable cut of 2.5 million m 3/yr was reduced
to just over half that level at the end of the war and has crept up only
slightly since then (Table 4). This decrease has been in part the result of
wartime decimation in highly accessible timber stands (e.g., in the former
War Zones C and D) as well as of the destruction of forest industries,
half of which were damaged or destroyed. 3 Lack of spare parts and fuel
for logging, transporting, and milling equipment has further hampered
postwar recovery of the industry. Moreover, unexploded munitions and
craters have hampered logging considerably. The rural road system needed
for timber transportation is in a bad state of repair. Metal fragments in
the logs seriously impede sawmilling. 34 The increasing demands of a
growing population for fuel wood and for some of the forest land itself
for agriculture have also contributed to the reduced harvest.
Natural processes of forest growth and of ecological succession are
helping to heal the wounds of war in Viet Nam's upland forests. Pioneer
vegetation became established quite quickly in most of the heavily damaged areas, thereby arresting further erosion and nutrient dumping. However, the tenure of this pioneer vegetation of herbaceous or woody grasses
which precedes the re-establishment of the desirable, dicotyledonous trees,
is measured in decades. Artificial regeneration is thus often called for,
despite the trouble and long-delayed return on investment involved. Indeed, even before the end of the war Viet Nam initiated a modest reforestation program of several thousand hectares per year, much of it to
counter erosion brought on by bombing damage. 3 5 Today, a number of
new nurseries have been established in both North and South Viet Nam
in which some ten species of native and exotic trees, including teak and
pine, are being raised for outplanting. 36 Current national plans call for
the reforestation of 1.5 million ha and, according to one source, about
37
100,000 ha have been replanted annually since the end of the war.
In conclusion, the inland forests of Viet Nam are in rather poor condition today for a number of reasons. Shifting slash-and-burn agriculture
33. UMBRICHT, supra note 11, at 129.

34. Id. at 152, and Westing, Letter to the Editor (1972) supra note 26.
35. Westing, Postwar Forestry in North Vietnam, supra note 26.
36. Kohlstock, Erfahrungen und Schlussfolgerungen aus der PlanmassigenPflanzenanzucht far
Grossflachige Kiernaufforstungen in der SR Vietnam, 13 BEITRAGE FUR DIE FORSTWIRTSCHAFr 111

(1979).
37. Shehedrov, Vietnam Looks Confidently to the Future, 12 INTr'L AFFAIRS 25 (1979), and Tram,
Tree Planting:An Example Set by President Ho Chi Minh, 15 VIETNAM COURIER 8 (No. 9, 1979).
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continues to be the nation's most serious forestry problem. The annually
intensifying demand for fuel wood by a rapidly growing population and
the need for an ever greater area of cultivated land are further serious
threats to the integrity of this important renewable resource. The massive
war damage to the inland forest from which it will take several decades
to recover thus adds a substantial burden.
Coastal Mangrove Habitat
The mangrove habitat of Viet Nam covers about 400,000 ha (not including rear mangrove), more than three-quarters of it in South Viet Nam.
In contrast to inland habitats, this extraordinarily productive estuarine
habitat supports a relatively restricted biota. The plant species have in
common the ability to become established and survive in a mucky soil
which is periodically inundated with salt water. The dominant vegetation
consists of several species of small dicotyledonous trees, most 3 to 15
m high and primarily in the genera Rhizophora, Avicennia, Bruguiera,
and Sonneratia; the shrubby palm Nipa is also often in evidence. The
vegetation in turn is home to a variety of birds, mammals, and other
animals. This endlessly channel-dissected habitat is also of major importance as the breeding and/or nursery grounds for numerous salt-water
and fresh-water fish and crustaceans; indeed, it serves this function for
the majority of Viet Nam's offshore and river fish. The mangrove vegetation serves as well to stabilize the shoreline.
The mangrove habitat is of major regional importance as a source of
small timbers for pilings and construction, firewood, charcoal (from Rhizophora), thatch (from Nipa), tannin (from Ceriops and Rhizophora),
fish, crustaceans, honey, and other products.
During the Second Indochina War, an estimated 124,000 ha (or 41
percent) of South Viet Nam's mangrove habitat was utterly destroyed by
chemical attack, mostly between 1965 and 1970. The anti-plant chemical
warfare agents employed left this vast area virtually lifeless. In addition
to the biotic carnage, these attacks permitted serious erosion to occur,
both sheet erosion and shoreline erosion. There was some concern among
the international scientific community in the early 1970s that biotic recovery would take more than a century.
Examination of the attacked mangrove areas in 1980, a full decade or
more after their annihilation, revealed that some scattered patches of
perhaps 5 to 50 ha in size have to date remained barren of vegetation.
In the aggregate these bare patches amount to perhaps 5 to 10 percent of
the zone of original destruction. The reason these patches have thus far
remained bare is not altogether certain, although in at least some instances
it may be the result of a modestly depressed elevation. Attempted replantings in these bare patches have proved unsuccessful, except where
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the drainage has been improved by ditching and the patches have become
naturally revegetated or at least amenable to planting.
A few small areas adjacent to undamaged Rhizophora stands (by far
the most important of Viet Nam's mangrove species) have during the
post-destruction decade become naturally revegetated with Rhizophora.
Such natural regeneration appears to have occurred in about one percent
of the destroyed zone. After the deactivation of unexploded munitions
and the removal of existing vegetation, a further 10 percent of the destroyed area has now been replanted with Rhizophora. Present plans are
for several thousand hectares per year to be planted for several more
years. Rhizophora trees are ready for fuel wood harvest at an age of 30
to 40 years, at which time one tree yields 0.5 m 3 of wood that can be
converted to about 90 kg of top quality charcoal. A considerable scattering
of Nipa fruticans has also been planted along channels in Minh Hai
province as has a modest amount of Cyperus (two species) for use in
basketry, the palm and rushes together certainly amounting to less than
1,000 ha.
Some 5,000 ha, or about four percent, of destroyed mangrove habitat
has in recent years been converted to rice, and another few thousand
hectares to other food crops.
The remaining 93,000 ha, or about 75 percent, of the originally destroyed mangrove habitat became occupied by a variety of low-growing
and locally undesirable plant species within a few years of being denuded.
It is assumed that it will take one or more decades before the present
vegetation over this large area begins to give way to any considerable
extent to the desirable Rhizophora species, and even longer in the contiguously large destroyed areas unless, of course, expensive artificial
regeneration is resorted to.
Inshore ocean fishing, out no further than 12 to 15 km off the destroyed
mangrove areas, has reportedly continued to decline during the past decade. Indeed, the recent overall decline in Viet Nam's marine fishery is
attributed in part to the loss of mangrove habitat. Clams disappeared in
the destroyed mangrove areas and have returned only-and in reduced
numbers-in those areas in which Avicennia or Rhizophora has become
established.
With about one-third of it literally destroyed, the mangrove habitat was
the ecological system in Viet Nam most seriously affected by the Second
Indochina War. Moreover, subsequent conversion to agriculture and other
uses can be expected to more or less permanently reduce Viet Nam's
mangrove habitat, perhaps by 10 percent. The question thus arises to
what extent such long-term shrinkage will lead to special extinctions. The
number of species within any particular taxon that an isolated habitat can
support is related to its area. If a habitat is reduced in size, as was the
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case with Viet Nam's mangroves, the resulting excess of species will in
due course die out.
Prewar data on species numbers are not on hand for Viet Nam's mangrove habitat. Literature on comparable habitats in parts of the East
Indies, 3 8 and the Galapagos3 9 allows us to estimate that a 10 percent
reduction in Viet Nam's mangrove habitat is likely in time to lead to four
percent and three percent reductions respectively in the number of bird
and plant species that can be supported. If any of the species lost from
the area are endemic ones they will, of course, be lost to nature.
In conclusion, roughly one-third of Viet Nam's total mangrove habitat
has been lost for perhaps half a century or more, and is thus unavailable
throughout this protracted period for exploitation for charcoal and other
products so crucial to a growing population and a struggling economy.
Fisheries
The marine and inland fishery resources of Viet Nam provide an important source of protein-rich food. 4 ° Perhaps 75 percent of the catch is
consumed as fresh fish, 5 percent as dried fish, and the remaining 20
percent in the form of fish sauce. Viet Nam has close to 350,000 fishermen, 70 percent of whom are engaged in ocean fishing.
The annual marine catch increased for a brief period following the
Second Indochina War, owing to an upsurge of fishing activity (Table 5).
The catch has, however, been declining in recent years, partly due to
wartime damage to the mangrove breeding and nursery grounds. Significant decreases in the number and variety of planktonic and benthic forms
as well as in fish eggs had been noted in the destroyed mangrove areas
in the early 1970s, and such declines were associated with declines in
offshore fin-fish and shell-fish numbers. 4 The decline in Viet Nam's
marine fishery is also partly due to a paucity of equipment and to reductions in the fishing fleet. These reductions stem on the one hand from a
lack of spare parts and fuel, and on the other from the loss of boats taken
along by emigrants (the so-called boat people).
42
Viet Nam is now actively encouraging the establishment of fish ponds
and otherwise attempting to develop inland fishing. Indeed, some 100,000
ha of inland waters are being given over to intensive pisciculture (Table
1). A considerable number of the bomb craters located in farming areas
38. Preston, Canonical Distribution of Commonness and Rarity, 43 ECOLOGY 185, 195 (1962).
39. Id. at 197.
40. UMBRICHT, supra note 11, at 111.
41. D. DE SYLVA & H. MICHEL, EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. B. EFFECTS OF
MANGROVE DEFOLIATION ON THE ESTUARINE ECOLOGY AND FISHERIES OF SOUTH VIETNAM 113-17
(1974).
42. Tram, Uncle Ho's Fishponds, 15 VIETNAM COURIER 9 (No. 9, 1979).
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TABLE 5
The Marine Fisheries of Viet Nama

Year

Catchb
(1,000 tons)

Catch
per Capita c
(kg/cap)

Fish Sauce
Productionb
(million
liters)

Fish Sauce
per Capitac
(liters/cap)

1960
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

550d
550
610
590
520
490

18'
11
12
12
10
9

83
99
120
115
91

1.7
2.0
2.4
2.2
1.7

'The coastline is 3,260 km. long (North Viet Nam, 970 km; South Viet Nam, 2,290 km) and the 1977 fishing
fleet consisted of 47,000 boats, two-thirds of them motorized. See UMBRICHI, LANKESTER, & PANTULU, Supra
note 11, at 114. In addition to the marine fishery, inland fishing adds perhaps 15 to 20 percent to the annual
catch. Id. at 113, and UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, supra note 5, at 6.
b1 9 6 0 datum estimated from G. HUNG, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST VIETNAM 1955-80, at 177 (1977);
Smith, Area Handbook for North Vietnam, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET No. 550-57, at 294,
and PAMPHLET No. 550-55, at 331 (1967); 1975-79 data from VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE,
STATISTICAL DATA OFTHE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM, at 32 (1979) and table 13 (1978). The catch values

are in fresh (live) weight.
'Based on population figures from Table 2.
dNorth Viet Nam, 200,000 metric tons; South Viet Nam, 350,000 metric tons.
'South Viet Nam exported approximately 100,000 metric tons/yr during this period. See UMBRICHT, LANKESTER,
& PANTULU, supra note 11, at 114. Ocean fish consumption in Viet Nam in 1960 averaged perhaps 15 kg/cap
(North Viet Nam, 13 kg/cap; South Viet Nam, 18 kg. cap).

that penetrate the water table have been converted to fish ponds. An
annual fish yield of 2 to 3 t/ha is expected from intensive freshwater
pisciculture. Moreover, some current research efforts in the Mekong Delta
are aimed at developing a shrimp culture industry as one means of utilizing
portions of the reclaimed mangrove habitat, and a similar effort is being
begun for crab culture.
In summary, Viet Nam's important marine fishery is in a continuing
postwar decline of several years' standing, one reason for which appears
to be linked to the major wartime disruption of the mangrove habitat.
EndangeredSpecies
Several decades of war culminating in the Second Indochina War did
much to disrupt the varied tropical habitats of Viet Nam and the once
plentiful wildlife that depended upon them. The current status of a43number
of rare and endangered species is described in detail elsewhere.
43. Westing & Westing, Endangered Species and Habitats of Viet Nam, 8 ENVT'L
59 (1981).
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A number of mammals, birds, and plants are threatened with extinction
as a result, at least in part, of wartime disruption. The scientific community of Viet Nam is highly sensitive to the plight of the country's
endangered species and to conservation issues in general. However, equipment, fuel, and other necessities are simply not available for systematic
on-site investigations of natural habitats and the wildlife which they support, nor do they suffice for major rehabilitation programs. Moreover,
the plethora of unexploded munitions that remains hidden in the wilds
makes field operations highly dangerous.
Current national priorities serve to channel most of the efforts of the
scientific community into improving agricultural productivity of both food
and industrial crops, or into utilizing natural resources for domestic consumption and export. Some of the war-damaged natural habitats are not,
therefore, being permitted to revert to nature but are, instead, being
converted to agriculture. Reduction in the size of a natural habitat, or its
fragmentation, as noted earlier, results in a reduction in the number of
species that an area can support. Inevitably, a number of species of plants
and animals will slip into oblivion, some noticed and others not. The hill
tribespeople pose another continuing conservation problem, owing to their
unwillingness to abide by the laws which would protect wildlife and
natural habitats.
At present, Viet Nam has one major nature reserve, the 25,000 ha Cue
Phuong National Park, which was established in 1962 in a mountainous
primeval forest area about 100 km southwest of Hanoi. This park is rich
in species of plants and animals and is scenically majestic. 4 It is possible
that a second such park will be established as a refuge for such native,
and at least locally endangered, species as the douc langur, banteng, wild
water buffalo, leopard, cloud leopard, hog deer, and Edwards's and imperial pheasants.
Agriculture
The Second Indochina War brought about agricultural disruption in a
of direct and indirect ways, both intentionally and unintentionvariety
45
ally.
In North Viet Nam, some fraction of the U.S. bombing and shelling
cratered cultivated lands and destroyed irrigation systems. Moreover, the
supporting infrastructure was to a large extent destroyed. Much livestock
was killed, including some 24,000 water buffaloes; about 1,600 water
44. N.A.T., Cuc Phuong National Park, 12 VIETNAM COURIER 26-28 (No. 3, 1976).
45. Westing (1980), supra note 1, at 85; Duy, Agriculture in South Viet Nam Before and After
Liberation, 13 VIETNAM COURIER 20 (No. 1, 1977); and Duy, Agriculture in Southern Viet Nam
Before and After Liberation, 13 VIETNAM COURIER 11, 22 (No. 2, 1977).
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conservancy works were damaged; dikes were breached in more than
1,000 places; and 48 agricultural schools and research stations were damaged. 4 6
In South Viet Nam, the United States carried out a routine military
policy of systematic large-scale crop destruction. 47 Chemical crop destruction from the air made up the greatest proportion of the major U.S.
resource denial program. Significant fractions of this U.S. program of
so-called economic warfare were also carried out by bombing and shelling, as well as by a variety of ground operations. Chemical crop destruction alone is estimated to have affected 400,000 ha of agricultural lands
in South Viet Nam, resulting in the immediate destruction of more than
300,000 tons of food. 48 Aside from the program of economic warfare,
an enormous amount of casual agricultural destruction took place. In
addition, South Viet Nam experienced a wartime dearth of available
manpower, owing to the high proportion of persons in military service,
military fatalities and other casualties, and the displacement of farmers
to urban areas; widespread deterioration of farm land due to abandonment
after the relentless rural bombing; and widespread destruction of livestock
including, perhaps, 900,000 water buffaloes. 49
Some measure of the military disruption of agriculture in South Viet
Nam can be gleaned from rice surplus and deficit figures.5 Before the
Second Indochina War, South Viet Nam's average annual export of processed (milled) rice was 200,000 metric tons, which represents the yield
from almost 150,000 ha. During the war years, the average import of
milled rice to South Viet Nam was 600,000 metric t/yr. 51 ' In South Vietnamese terms, this figure represents the yield from just over 400,000
ha. Military disruption can thus be estimated to have taken out of production during the war years the equivalent of about 600,000 ha, or
roughly one-fifth of Viet Nam's total farm land.
The immediate postwar efforts of the people of all Viet Nam made for
a 10 percent increase in overall agricultural output and an 18 percent
increase in food crop production by 1976 (Table 6). However, agricultural
advances since 1976 have been extraordinarily slow and in some respects
nonexistent (Table 7). The extent of cereal land sown has increased a
little each year, but the nationwide yield per unit area has remained
46. VIEN, supra note 11, at 7-8, and VIET NAM: DESTRUCTION,
28.
47. Westing, Crop Destruction as a Means of War, 37 BULL. OF
2, 1981).
48. Westing (1980), supra note 1, at 86.
49. ViEN, supra note 11, at 6-7, and VIET NAM: DESTRUCTION,
23-27.
50. Duy (Vol. 1, 1977), supra note 45, at 20.
51. Id.

WAR DAMAGE,

supra note 6, at

THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

WAR DAMAGE,

38 (No.

supra note 6, at
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TABLE 6
Gross Production Indices for Viet Nam a

Year

Populationb

Food Crop
Production'

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

100
103
106
108
110

100
118
108
108
120

Industrial
Crop
Livestock
c
c
Production Production
100
103
94
108
104

100
101
108
94
102

Overall
Agricultural
Production'

Industrial
Production
(Non- d
agricultural)

100
110
105
105
112

100
113
124
131
125

aThe agricultural and industrial indices are all based on constant prices.
bBased on population values from Table 2.
'From

VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, STATISTICAL DATA OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

53 (1979).
dld., at 29.

essentially constant since before the war. Barely self-sufficient in cereals
(by low standards) before the war, Viet Nam has had to rely on food
imports since the war in order to stave off famine. Widespread signs of
malnutrition have been reported. 2
Viet Nam has more than a million new mouths to feed each year (Table
2). The area sown in cereals in Viet Nam, 0.13 ha/cap (Table 7), is rather
low by tropical standards which average 0.30 ha/cap,5 3 but its expansion
since the end of the war has more than matched the pace of population
expansion. However, with an unimproved overall yield per unit area, the
production per capita remains inadequate.
The essentially constant national unit area yield figures can be attributed
to a host of factors. Without question, wartime disruption of the rural
areas has been a major contributor to this calamity; postwar area yields
have increased over prewar yields in lightly damaged North Viet Nam,
but remained stationary in more heavily damaged South Viet Nam (Table
7). In addition, the agricultural expansion associated with the new frontier
or new economic zone program has occurred on relatively unsuitable
land. The war-destroyed forest lands included in the agricultural expansion are better suited to growing trees than farm crops, especially in the
absence of increasingly expensive fertilizers.
The inauspicious agricultural situation can be further attributed to the
large-scale loss of draught animals (water buffaloes) and a lack of fuel
52. Kaufman, Vietnam 1978: Crisis in Food, Nutrition, and Health, 74 J. AM. DiTETic Assoc.
310 (1979).
53. Westing (1980), supra note 1, Table 1.1.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

TABLE 7
Cereal (Grain) Production in North and South Viet Nama

Year

Area
Sown'
(million ha)

North Viet Nam
1960
2.0
1976
2.8
1979
3.1

Yield per
Unit Area
(unprocessed)
tons/ha

Area
Sown per
Capitad
(ha/cap)

Production
per Capita
(processed)e
(kg/cap)

3.1
6.2
6.0

1.5
2.2
1.9

0.13
0.11
0.12

128
166
152

5.4
7.3
7.7

2.2
2.2
2.0

0.18
0.14
0.14

257
200
195

8.5
11.6
13.5
12.9
12.9
13.7
14.0

1.9
2.1
2.2
2.0
1.9
2.0

0.15
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.13

189
162
183
170
167
174
174

Yield
(unprocessed),
(million tons)

Imports
(processed)'
(million tons)

South Viet Nam

1960
1976
1979

2.5
3.4
3.8

All Viet Nam,

1960
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

4.5
5.6
6.2
6.6
6.8
6.9

9
1.0
0.7
1.3
1.4
1.6

'Rice accounted for over 90 percent of cereal area and production in 1960, decreasing to about 80 percent in 1979.
t1960 data from G. HUNG, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIALIST VIETNAM 1955-80 at 4-5 (1977); 1975-79
data from VIr

NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, STATISTICAL DATA OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET

NAM at 54, 56 (1979).
c1960 data from HUNG, supra item b; 1975-79 data from

VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, supra item
b, at 55-56; 1980 datum from Chanda, Vietnam's Economic Post-mortem: Realism Creeps into Planning as the
Second Five-Year Plan Fails, Ill FAR EASTERN ECON. REV. 3, at 40. (1981). The data are presented in terms of

unprocessed rice equivalent. 1.43 kg. of maize equals 1kg. of rice.
dBased on population figures from Table 2, using appropriate growth rates for North and South Viet Nam.
'Based on population figures from Table 2 and a conversion factor of 0.667 from unprocessed to processed (milled)
rice. A minimal annual amount for nutrition is considered to be about 187 kg/cap. Somewhat more (about 10
percent?) is needed to account for seed requirements and loss in storage.
fFrom VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, supra item b, at 87; and VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL
OFFICE, STATISTICAL DATA OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM at table 39 (1978).
'South Viet Nam exported 0.4 million tons of processed rice in 1960 (and an annual average of 0.2 million tons
during the four years 1957-61). Duy, 13 VIETNAM COURIER 1, supra note 45, at 20.
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or spare parts for the few existing farm tractors. The prewar number of
water buffaloes per unit area of sown land has not been reattained during
the postwar years, and postwar fertilizer and pesticide inputs per unit area
remain low and relatively unchanging (Table 8). The water conservancy
and associated irrigation systems that were disrupted during the war have
not all been restored as yet. High-yield rice varieties developed in recent
years cannot fulfill their genetic potential without a carefully regulated
and fully adequate water regime as well as high levels of fertilizer and
pesticide applications.
Some fraction of today's agricultural work force has inadequate agricultural experience or training, due to wartime military service or wartime
displacement to urban centers, and some of the potential agricultural work
force is in military service at this time.
Although North Viet Nam has been able to increase its prewar per
capita cereal productivity (Table 7), it has nevertheless maintained its
traditional inability to be agriculturally self-sufficient. South Viet Nam,
whose agriculture was far more seriously disrupted by the Second Indochina War, is now essentially self-sufficient at an austere level, but has
not as yet regained its comfortable prewar surplus. To some extent this
appears to be the result of a reluctance on the part of South Vietnamese
farmers to form agricultural collectives or to produce a surplus for the
North without being able to receive compensation in the form of consumer
goods.
United Viet Nam hopes to come to grips with its agricultural shortfalls
by a multiplicity of approaches, as enunciated in its recent five-year plan
which gave agricultural development top priority.5 4 Continued dependence by Viet Nam on staple food imports is an unacceptable situation in
the face of such modest present potential for exports and in the light of
growing worldwide food shortages. Moreover, with a relatively modest
endowment in the form of minerals, Viet Nam must develop more industrial crops, both as a source of raw materials to supply its indigenous
industry and as a major contributor to exports.
Rubber
Before the Second Indochina War, rubber was of great economic importance in South Viet Nam," accounting for about 60 percent of the
total value of exports and employing some 100,000 workers. The rubber
plantations were located in areas subject to intense military activity during
54. Brow, Vietnam's 5-year Plan Stresses Agriculture, 16 FOREIGN AGRICULTURE 2 (No. 16,
1978); Vy, Green Belt Around Ho Chi Minh City, 15 VIETNAM COURIER 10-11 (No. 8, 1979).
55. Westing (1980), supra note 1, at 83; and Cuong, Natural Rubber in Vietnam, 14 VIETNAM
COURIER 23 (No. 11, 1978).
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the war and, as a result, suffered considerable damage from indiscriminate
wide-area bombing, shelling, and chemical attack. Processing facilities
were also destroyed in many instances. About 40 percent of South Viet
Nam's plantation trees were destroyed during the war, and overall production was reduced by about 70 percent (Table 9).
The war-reduced land area devoted to rubber plantations has hardly
been expanded since the war ended, although there are plans to match
the prewar scope as economic conditions permit. Existing plantations
have been in part rehabilitated through removal of unexploded munitions
(so far resulting in some 400 casualties), replanting, and so forth. The
yield per unit area is beginning to approach prewar levels. Rubber export
in the form of latex has regained roughly half the prewar level (Table 9).
In short, Viet Nam's important rubber industry suffered substantial
damage from the Second Indochina War and is recovering at a very slow
pace. Indeed, the reattainment of prewar production and export levels
seems to be many years off.
THE LESSON OF VIET NAM
It is a truism that warfare is detrimental to the environment. However,
the Second Indochina War ushered in a new level of anti-environmental
ferocity. Faced with a dispersed and elusive enemy in South Viet Nam,
the United States sought to deny this foe both sanctuary and freedom of
TABLE 9
Rubber Data for Viet Nama

Year

Areab
(million ha)

Yieldc
(thousand tons)

Yield per
Unit Area
(kg/ha)

Exportsd
(thousand tons)

1960
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979

135
81
82
81
81
83

78
24
24
42
46
43

580
300
300
520
570
520

70
7
28
36
25
33

Virtually all rubber production is in South Viet Nam.
b1 9 60 datum from SIPRI Y.B. (1980), supra note 1, at 84; 1975, 1976, 1978, and 1979 data from VmT NAM
at 68 (1979); 1977
datum interpolated.
11960 datum from G. HUNG, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SOCA.LIST VIETNAM 1955-80 at table 4-5 (1977);
1975-79 data from ViEr NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, supra item b, at table 43. Yield is expressed in
terms of dried latex.
d 19 60 datum from Duy, 13 VIETNAM COURIER No. 1,supra note 45, at 21; 1975-79 data from VIET NAM GENERAL
STATISTICAL OFFICE, supra item b, at 86; and VIET NAM GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, STATISTICAL DATA OF
THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM at table 38 (1978).
GENERAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, STATISTICAL DATA OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 23

movement and a local civilian economy from which to derive sustenance.
The U.S. strategy, meant to achieve these goals, required the profligate
expenditure of munitions, both conventional and unconventional, directed
in large measure against the fields and forests of South Viet Nam. The
emphasis here has been on the impact of these actions on the ecology
and economic development of Viet Nam, and only cursory treatment has
been given to the more strictly social sequelae'of the war.
The Second Indochina War has shown that the impact of environmental
warfare spills over the spatial and temporal bounds of the attacks and
that the brunt of such attacks is borne by the civilian population. Indeed,
the civilian sector continues to bear this burden long after hostilities have
ended. Despite the massive level of disruption of Viet Nam's natural
resources, the military objectives were not achieved in the end. Their
realization would have required an intensification of the assault to truly
ecocidal and thus genocidal proportions.
Presumably as a direct outcome of the Second Indochina War, at least
some faction of the international community has come to recognize the
unacceptability of military assaults on the environment as a strategy of
war. For example, 38 or more nations have, as of the end of 1982, ratified
or acceded to the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any
other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. This Convention, which took effect in 1978, prohibits the parties from engaging
in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage, or injury.5 6 Similary, 18 nations, as of the end of
1981, have ratified the 1977 Protocol (1) Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts. This Protocol, which took effect in 1978,
inter alia limits attacks on agricultural lands, prohibits starvation as a
restricts means of war that would damage the
method of warfare, 5and
7
natural environment.
As much as a decade has now elasped since the time of the major antienvironmental assaults against Viet Nam. Their effects are agonizingly
slow to disappear. Indeed, Viet Nam's industrial production is recovering
more rapidly than its far more directly land-based agricultural productivity
(Table 6), a phenomenon that was also observed among European countries embroiled in World War 11.58
Natural ecological recovery of a disrupted habitat is an inevitable phenomenon, albeit a slow one. In many instances, human action can aid
56. Goldblat, Arms Control: A Survey and Appraisal of Multilateral Agreements, 1978 SIPRI
Y.B. 123 (1978); and Westing (1980), supra note 1, at 201.
57. Goldblat, id. at 125.
58. Westing (1980), supra note 1, at 61.
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such natural recovery. The expertise and financial resources required,
however, are in short supply in a war-ravaged and otherwise impoverished
nation such as Viet Nam. Viet Nam is thus now dependent upon foreign
assistance, a need that has been recognized by the United Nations5 9 and
at least tacitly acknowledged by Viet Nam itself in that its national fiveyear plan of 1976-80 was heavily dependent upon such aid.6 °
In the postwar period Viet Nam has received aid from at least 11
organizations of the United Nations system, from 17 or more nations,
and from various private agencies located around the world. Total annual
aid in recent years has been approximately $1.5 billion, placing Viet Nam
among the several highest aid recipients in the world. One might add
that the poor condition in which Viet Nam finds itself today despite the
relatively high level of foreign assistance emphasizes the enormity of its
war damage. One can also argue that the situation might improve if fewer
resources were allocated to the military sector. Indeed, Viet Nam's complement of armed forces
of 600,00061 or more6 2 is extraordinarily large
63
standards.
by various
Viet Nam's introduction into the age of technology has been a brutal
one. It can only be hoped that the future will be kinder to it than the
recent past, and that man and nature will cooperate to restore this region
to its former productive beauty as rapidly as possible.

59. UMBRICHT, supra note 11, at 100; U.N.G.A. Res. 32/3 (1977); Assembly Calls for Aid for
Viet Nam Reconstruction, 14 UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE 11 at 57 (1977); and Viet Nam's Aid for This
Year Estimated at $800 Million, 15 UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE 4, at 61 (1978).
60. Thayer, Vietnam: BeleagueredOutpost of Socialism, 79 CURRENT HISTORY 165-67 (1980);
Niehaus, Vietnam 1978: the Elusive Peace, 19 ASIAN SURVEY 1, at 87 (1979).
61. U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 4, at Table 2.
62. INTERNATIONAL INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, MILITARY BALANCE, 1980-81 at 76 (1980).
63. Westing (1980), supra note 1, at Table 1.13.

